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CASE NOTE 
 
A Growing Good Faith in Contracts 
By 
Professor Julie-Anne Tarr 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The topic of good faith generates considerable judicial attention worldwide and a significant volume of 
commentary and academic literature. As the Oxford University Obligations Group observe: 
 
“Good faith is a topic that has been written about at inordinate length, by an almost intolerably 
wide group of people – some worth reading, some not”.1  
 
This writer is guilty of being a contributor to this literary prolixity2 and the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew3 in motivating this case note will make for serial offender 
status. However the court’s decision in this case merits attention as being “perhaps the most important 
contract decision of the past 20 years....”4 
 
Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions have embraced as part of their jurisprudence an obligation upon 
parties to an insurance contract to act in good faith towards each other in the formation and 
performance of that insurance contract5. The origins of the duty have occasioned considerable debate  
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with the most accepted view being that the duty of utmost good faith and the duty of disclosure are not 
based on an implied term in the contract, nor significantly are these duties limited to insurance 
contracts6. These duties, according to the accepted view, are common law duties arising outside of the 
contract and applicable to all contracts of utmost good faith. As the High Court of Australia explained in 
Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW)7 the duty of disclosure was an obligation which was 
imposed by the common law as an incident of the relationship between insurer and insured . The Court 
pointed out that there were numerous conceptual difficulties in basing this duty on an implied term of 
the contract of insurance; for example, the duty of disclosure was logically anterior to the making of the 
contract and to treat it as a special implied term lay ill with the general rule that the dealings of parties 
preliminary to a formal contract were not part of the contract itself .  
 
In Iscor Pension Fund v Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd  8the South African court, struggling with similar 
information asymmetry issues in service provisions, observed that in some contracts  parties are 
required to place their cards on the table to a greater extent than in others, but the determination of 
the extent of the disclosure does not depend on the label “we choose to stick on a contract.” This 
statement captures the essential foundation of the obligation; namely, that it is the relationship 
between the parties that is crucial to the determination of the obligation(s) between them. A good 
statutory example of this is to be found in an unfair contract terms provision in the Consumer Rights Act 
2015(UK). In regulating the operation and effect of terms in contracts between consumers and 
businesses, a relationship that most commonly will reflect an imbalance in the relative bargaining 
strengths and knowledge of the parties, a good faith brake is inserted. Section 62(4) of this Act states 
that a term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.   
 
Similarly the High Court in England in the recent case of Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data 
Capture Ltd9 implied a duty of good faith in a contract under which the parties had collaborated on 
producing training manuals for commercial airline pilots. Critical to the court’s decision was its finding 
that the agreement in question was a “relational” contract, an expression used by Leggatt J in the earlier 
case of Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd .10 In the Yam Seng case Leggatt J  
observed that English contract law had not historically recognised a legal principle of good faith of 
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general application but rather its implication by law in some categories of contract such as employment 
contracts, partnership agreements and agreements involving fiduciary relationships. He stated that this 
reluctance was misplaced and that a duty of good faith should be implied into ordinary commercial 
contracts especially where those contracts might be characterised as “relational contracts”; namely, 
contracts which require a high degree of communication, co-operation and predictable performance 
based on mutual trust and loyalty and which involve expectations of loyalty which are implicit in the 
parties understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements”11. In applying this 
reasoning in the Bristol Groundschool case the court held that the unauthorised downloading of material 
by one party was commercially unacceptable and in breach of the implied duty of good faith, the 
relevant test being whether the conduct in question would be regarded as commercially unacceptable 
by reasonable and honest people in the particular context involved12.  
 
These cases suggest an emerging doctrine of good faith of general application to all commercial 
contracts but this matter is by no means resolved in all common law jurisdictions. 13 However, at least in 
Canada the position is now clear and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision contains analysis and 
reasoning that may be extremely helpful in promoting a unified treatment of this topic across the 
common law world.  
2. Bhasin v Hrynew14 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew considered the operation of a discretionary renewal 
clause in a commercial dealership agreement. Canadian American Financial Corp. Canada Ltd (‘The 
company’) marketed education savings plans to investors using retail lenders known as enrolment 
directors, to sell their plans. The appellant in this case (‘Bhasin’) was an enrolment director operating a 
small business. The respondent was the company and Mr Hrynew (‘Hrynew’), another enrolment 
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director. The contract between the Bhasin and the company provided that the term of the contract was 
three years and that the contract would automatically renew at the end of the three -year term unless 
one of the parties gave six month’s written notice to the contrary . 
The company decided not to renew its agreement with Bhasin and he brought an action against the 
company and Hrynew, claiming that the company’s conduct constituted a failure to act with good faith 
and breached an implied term in the contract that decisions about whether to renew the contract would 
be made in good faith. The trial judge agreed, but his decision was unanimously overturned by the 
Alberta Court of Appeal. The appellate court did not consider it necessary nor appropriate, in these 
circumstances, to interfere with a contract that was clear and unambiguous on its terms. The Supreme 
Court of Canada restored the decision of the trial judge. 
It was  found that Hrynew had pressured the company into the decision not to renew the agency and 
that the company had dealt dishonestly with Bhasin in giving in to this pressure. Hrynew, who operated 
the largest agency in Calgary and who enjoyed a good working relationship with the Alberta Securi ties 
Commission(‘ASC’), which regulated the company’s business, had long wanted to capture Bhasin’s 
lucrative niche market. Hrynew had approached Bhasin on several occasions proposing a merger of their 
agencies, actively encouraged the company to force the merger and made veiled threats that he would 
leave if no merger occurred. The proposed merger was in effect a hostile take over of Bhasin’s agency, 
and not surprisingly Bhasin steadfastly refused to participate in such a merger. During this time period 
the ASC had raised concerns about compliance issues among the company’s enrolment directors and 
when the Comission required the company to appoint a single provincial trading officer to monitor 
compliance Hrynew was appointed. This role required Hrynew to conduct audits of the company’s 
enrolment directors. Bhasin and another enrolment director objected to having Hrynew, a compet itor, 
review their confidential business records. 
The company, without consulting Bhasin, held discussions with ASC outlining the restructuring of its 
agencies and plans to have Bhasin working for Hrynew’s agency. Further the company misled Bhasin by 
telling him that Hrynew as the provincial trading officer was obliged to treat information confidentially 
and that the ASC had rejected a proposal to have an outside independent person discharge this role – 
neither statement was true. The company also responded equivocally when Bhasin asked whether a 
merger was a ‘done deal’, and threatened to terminate the agreement when Bhasin continued to refuse 
to allow Hrynew to audit his records. At the expiry of the contract term, Bhasin lost the value in his 
business in his assembled workforce and the majority of his sales agents were successfully solicited by 
Hrynew’s agency. Bhasin was obliged to take less remunerative work with one of the company’s 
competitors.  
In resolving in favour of Bhasin, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that Anglo-Canadian common law 
“has resisted acknowledging any generalized and independent doctrine of good faith in the performance 
of contracts”15 with consequence that the common law is piecemeal, unsettled and unclear.  The court 
concluded that two incremental steps were necessary to make the common law more coherent and 
more just; namely: 
 Acknowledge that good faith contractual performance is a general organizing principle of the 
common law of contract which underpins and informs the various rules in which the common 
law, in various situations and types of relationships, recognizes obligations of good faith 
contractual performance16.   
 Recognize, as a further manifestation of this organizing principle of good faith, that there is a 
common law duty which applies to all contracts to act honestly in the performance of 
contractual obligations.   
The court stated that by taking these two steps a duty would be established that is just, accords with the 
‘reasonable expectations of commercial parties and is sufficiently precise that it will enhance rather than 
detract from commercial certainty’17.  
 Cromwell J in delivering reasons for the judgment (McLachlin CJ, and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, 
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ concurring) stated that this organizing principle requires that parties 
generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or 
arbitrarily. Moreover the learned judge observed that this organising principle  states in general terms a 
requirement of justice from which more specific legal doctrines may be derived. An organizing principle 
therefore is not a free-standing rule, but rather a standard that underpins and is manifested in more 
specific legal doctrines and may be given different weight in different situations.  It is a standard that 
helps to understand and develop the law in a coherent and principled way 18. Accordingly the organizing 
principle of good faith: 
“... exemplifies the notion that, in carrying out his or her own performance of the  contract, a 
contracting party should have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of the 
contracting partner.  While “appropriate regard” for the other party’s interests will vary 
depending on the context of the contractual relationship, it does not require acting to serve 
those interests in all cases.  It merely requires that a party not seek to undermine those interests 
in bad faith.  This general principle has strong conceptual differences from the much higher 
obligations of a fiduciary.  Unlike fiduciary duties, good faith performance does not engage 
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duties of loyalty to the other contracting party or a duty to put the interests of the other 
contracting party first. “19 
The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that the principle of good faith had to be applied in a 
manner that was consistent with the fundamental commitments of the common law of contract which 
generally places great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual 
self-interest. Cromwell J comments that: 
“In commerce, a party may sometimes cause loss to another — even intentionally — in the 
legitimate pursuit of economic self-interest. Doing so is not necessarily contrary to good faith 
and in some cases has actually been encouraged by the courts on the basis of economic 
efficiency.  The development of the principle of good faith must be clear not to veer into a form 
of ad hoc judicial moralism or “palm tree” justice.  In particular, the organizing principle of good 
faith should not be used as a pretext for scrutinizing the motives of contracting parties”20.   
Nevertheless  under this new general duty requiring honesty in contractual performance, the Court 
stated that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked 
to the performance of the contract.  This does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a 
party to forego advantages flowing from the contract; it is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead the 
other party about one’s contractual performance.  Recognizing a duty of honest performance flowing 
directly from the common law organizing principle of good faith is an “appropriate incremental step”21.  
 The court held that the company was liable for damages calculated on the basis of what Bhasin’s 
economic position would have been had the company fulfilled its duty. It held that damages were to be 
assessed on the basis that if the company had performed the contract honestly, Bhasin would have been 
able to retain the value of his business rather than see it, in effect, expropriated and turned over to 
Hrynew.   
3. Conclusions 
This case is a significant step forward in harmonising the approach to good faith in contracting in an 
increasingly integrated global commercial environment.  
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A general principle of good faith (derived from Roman law) is recognized by most civil law systems – 
including those of Germany, France and Italy. From that source references to good faith have already 
entered into English law via European Union legislation. For example, the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999, which gives effect to a European directive, contains a requirement of good 
faith22. Similarly a general doctrine of good faith has long been recognized in the United States23. The 
Uniform Commercial Code, first promulgated in 1951, provides in section 1-203 that "every contract or 
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Similarly, 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states in section 205 that "every contract imposes upon each 
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement."  
A Canadian contracts scholar, writing in 1984, commented that the common law has taken a ‘kind of 
perverted pride’ in the absence of any general notion of good faith.24 It is submitted therefore that a 
broad recognition of a new common law duty of good faith applicable to all contracts  is timely and, in 
the context of globalization of law and commerce, propitious, if not inevitable. As Posner J stated in 
Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v Frey:  
“The contractual duty of good faith is... not some newfangled bit of welfare -state paternalism or... 
the sediment of an altruistic strain in contract law...”25 
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